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"There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the Supreme] Court
and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expres-
sions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an
essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is
this country's constitutional goal."' Yet, there are times when a balance
must be struck between this essential right and other fundamental
rights.2 In no other area is this more apparent than when a child victim
of sexual abuse takes the witness stand. Despite evidence that the inci-
dence of sexual assaults on children is reaching staggering proportions, 3
no system has been established yet to preserve the accused's constitu-
tional rights while at the same time protecting the child victim.
Statistics show that successful prosecutions of sexual assault are
rare.4 One reason cited is the necessary reliance on the testimony of the
victim.5 Although children may be the sole eyewitness to the abuse,
youth, compounded by the trauma that results from testifying to intimate
details of the assault in front of the defendant, may hinder effective testi-
mony. Commentators have noted that the courtroom experience can
"precipitate as much of a psychological crisis as the rape itself."' 6 This
* B.S. 1983, Louisiana State University Medical School; Member, Third Year Class.
1. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
2. The Court often conducts a balancing test in sixth amendment adjudications. See,
ag., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987) (state's interest in the confidentiality of its
investigative files concerning child abuse outweighed defendant's sixth amendment rights of
discovery and cross-examination).
3. Studies indicate that as many as one in every three female adults was sexually abused
as a child. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE FAIR TREATMENT OF
CHILD WITNESSES IN CASES WHERE CHILD ABUSE IS ALLEGED 7 (1985) [hereinafter AMER-
ICAN BAR ASSOCIATION].
4. See Note, Sexually Abused Children: The Best Kept Legal Secret, 3 N.Y.L. SCH.
HUM. RTs. ANN. 441, 446 (1986) (authored by Demetra John McBride) ("It is estimated that
only 24% of all cases nationwide result in criminal actions." (footnote omitted)).
5. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1003.
6. Frumkin, The First Amendment and Mandatory Courtroom Closure in Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court: The Press' Right, The Child Rape Victim's Plight, 11 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 637, 637 (1984) (quoting L. HOLSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE
229) (1978); see also Note, Protecting Child Rape Victims from the Public and Press After
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lessens the child's ability to testify effectively. 7
States have responded to this problem by enacting laws to protect
the minor victim. 8 These statutes authorize a range of procedures
designed to shield the victim from the trauma of confronting the defend-
ant in an intimidating courtroom atmosphere. While the statutes provide
necessary protections for the child victim, their use may compromise es-
sential constitutional rights of the accused.
The constitutionality of one such statute was the subject of the
United States Supreme Court opinion in Coy v. Iowa.9 Coy involved a
rape trial in which a one-way screening barrier was placed between the
defendant and the complaining child witnesses at the jury trial, so that
the defendant was able to see and hear the child testify while the child
was not able to see the defendant. The defendant was convicted, and he
appealed charging violations of his sixth amendment right to confront his
accuser and his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law. 10 The
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the use of the procedure, but the United
States Supreme Court reversed." The Court ruled that the use of the
screen violated the defendant's confrontation clause rights.' 2
This Comment discusses and criticizes the Coy opinion and assesses
its probable effect on future adjudications involving child sexual assault.
Part I examines the problem of the child victim testifying in court and
describes the efforts of states to address that problem. The Coy Court's
response to state intervention is discussed in Part II, while Part III criti-
cizes the opinion and explores the potential implications of Coy on future
adjudications.
I. The Problem and Resulting State Intervention
The child victim's testimony is crucial to obtaining convictions in
sexual abuse cases. Their eyewitness testimony may be the only direct
link between the victim, the crime, and the offender. 13 As communities
become increasingly aware of the high incidence of sexual assault 4, they
Globe Newspaper and Cox Broadcasting, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 269 (1983) (authored by
Susan Cohn) (testimony required and publicity generated expose victim to embarrassment and
degradation).
7. Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1984) ("Guilt, fear, trauma, cognitive immaturity, and 'incest dy-
namics' may all undermine the child's ability to testify effectively.").
8. See infra notes 20-58 and accompanying text.
9. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
10. Id. at 2799.
11. Id. at 2803.
12. Id. at 2802.
13. Flammang, Interviewing Child Victims of Sex Offenders, in THE SEXUAL VIC-
TIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 175, 178 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
14. The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect estimates that four hundred thou-
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place more pressure on the criminal justice system to prosecute cases.
Thus, child victims are necessary and increasingly sought participants in
the legal system.
The children who serve as witnesses must endure a frightening expe-
rience. They must testify in an adult environment, the courtroom, which
is unfamiliar with their needs.':5 The courtroom experience is stressful
for any witness, but many commentators believe it is particularly trau-
matic for children unaccustomed to legal proceedings. 16 The victims
must describe repeatedly the intimate and often embarrassing details of
the event while the defense counsel vigorously attacks their credibility. 17
In recognition of the children's situation, several states have enacted stat-
utes to protect child witnesses.18 These enactments attempt to provide a
reasonable and compassionate compromise to balance the interests of the
accused and accuser. Initially, reform was urged in the physical config-
uration of the courtroom. 19 This view was replaced, however, with em-
phasis on creating new hearsay exceptions, allowing videotaped
testimony, allowing closure of the courtroom, and using closed circuit
television.
sand children are sexually assaulted each year. NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE & NE-
GLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Child Sexual Abuse: Incest, Assault &
Sexual Exploitation, (1981).
15. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 3, at 7.
16. See, e.g., Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the
Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 181, 203 (1985):
[T]here are several reasons to predict greater stress for children. The situation will
be more novel and less predictable for the child than for adults; the sight of the
defendant may be particularly disturbing because the child might believe that the
defendant will retaliate against the child in the courtroom; or the child may think he
or she, rather than the defendant, will be sent to jail or taken from home.
See also Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REv. 809,
813-17 (1987) (empirical investigation revealed that children's recall and willingness to report
recall differs with settings). But see Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual
Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 1015 (1969) (Empirical evi-
dence has proven inconclusive. In psychological studies of actual victims, it is extremely diffi-
cult to distinguish between the trauma caused by the sexual abuse itself and trauma caused by
the courtroom experience. Experiments that simulate courtroom situations cannot ethically
expose subjects to overly realistic and stressful situations to obtain this information.).
17. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 3, at 21. (The greatest ordeal children
must face is direct and cross-examination. The defense counsel attacks the child's credibility
and the prosecutor cannot object for fear of appearing overly protective of the witness. Judges
forgo interference for fear of influencing the jury.).
18. Forty-one states have laws protecting child witnesses. Twenty-seven states have en-
acted videotaping statutes. Twenty-two states have enacted hearsay exception statutes.
Twenty-six states have enacted courtroom closure statutes. Twenty-one states have enacted
closed-circuit television statutes. See infra notes 26, 33, 45, 52.
19. See Libai, supra note 16, at 1014.
A. Background
At first, the implementation of a "child's courtroom" was recom-
mended to protect the child witness during testimony. 20 This courtroom
provided a more informal setting for child witnesses than the traditional
courtroom. Only the judge, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and the
child examiner 21 would be present for the child's testimony. The jury,
the accused, and the audience would sit behind a one way glass partition,
which would enable them to observe the proceedings, but would prevent
the child from seeing the defendant and others in the courtroom. The
accused would have a microphone and earphone to allow communication
with counsel. If identification of the defendant was necessary, the de-
fendant would be allowed to emerge from behind the partition for a mo-
ment. Ostensibly, these changes would reduce the trauma for the child,
but still provide a constitutionally fair trial for the defendant.
Although this early suggestion was never implemented, it prompted
the proposal of a model act to protect child witnesses.22 The act incorpo-
rated many early suggestions as well as some modifications and addi-
tions. It advocated the construction of a special child courtroom and the
employ of a Child Hearing Officer, who was actually an attorney trained
in psychology, nursing, social work, or clinical interviewing, to act as
counsel to the child witness during trial.23 Additionally, speedy trial and
discovery would be encouraged to prevent subjecting the child to "the
trauma of delayed or drawn-out proceedings."' 24 The goal of the pro-
posed legislation was "to reduce the trauma to the child at both the pre-
trial and trial stages by affording him as much protection as is consistent
with the constitutional rights of the accused."'25
Like the child's courtroom, this model act was never implemented.
Nevertheless, the early proposals sparked state experimentation with var-
ious mechanisms for protecting child witnesses. The resulting legislative
enactments are examined below.
B. Videotaping Statutes
Twenty-seven states have enacted videotaping statutes, which au-
thorize the child's testimony to be preserved on videotape for later pres-
20. Id.
21. A child examiner is a trained professional who initially interviews the child and takes
care of the child during the trial. Libai, supra note 16, at 1002.
22. See generally Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpe-
trator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 643 (1982) (proposes "A Model Act" based on Libai, The
Protection of a Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L.
REV. 977 (1969)).
23. Id. at 664-73.
24. Id. at 671.
25. Id. at 653.
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entation at trial.26 The use of videotaped testimony serves many
purposes. First, repetitive interviews and the subsequent trauma are re-
duced.27 Second, the child's initial reaction and memory of the event are
recorded for later use in therapy.28 Third, an immediate recording of the
interviews may prevent the complaint from being disavowed. 29 Finally, a
defendant may plead guilty when faced with a videotaped statement by a
child witness. 30
Although the use of videotaped testimony may compromise the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to confront the witness, many courts are
upholding its introduction at trial. For example, in Jolly v. Texas,31 a
Texas appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by admitting a videotaped recording of an interview of the victim by
a child placement specialist. The Court of Appeals of Arizona, in State v.
Melendez, 32 also has allowed the admission of videotaped testimony of a
child molestation victim.
Some states resolve the constitutional issues in their statutory
schemes. For example, nine states require that the defendant be present
and cross-examination be allowed at the videotaping session.33 In these
26. ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (SuPP. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to -2037 (1985); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1346 (West 1985); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1984); Act of July 8, 1985, Pub. Act
No. 85-587, 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 463 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1985); FLA.
STAT. § 92.53 (1985); IOWA CODE § 910A.3 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (Supp.
1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1205
(1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.680 to
.687 (Vernon 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 174.229 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
9-17 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1
(1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (1985);
TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5
(1985); VT. R. EVID. 807 (Supp. 1988); WIs. STAT. § 967.04 (7) (1983). See NATIONAL
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, PROTECTING CHILD
VICTIM/WrrNESSES: SAMPLE LAWS AND MATERIALS 31-34 (1986) [hereinafter SAMPLE
LAWS]. See infra note 33.
27. MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 136-37 (1985).
28. Id at 139.
29. Id at 141 ("The likelihood that sexually abused children will take back their disclo-
sures of abuse is becoming increasingly well documented.").
30. Eatman, Videotaping Interviews with Child Sex Offense Victims, 7 CHILDREN'S
LEGAL RTs. J. 13 (1986).
31. 681 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
32. 135 Ariz. 390, 393, 661 P.2d 654, 657 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
33. ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 134253 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (Supp. 1988); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3211 (Supp. 1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie Supp. 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.227 (Michie
1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); OKLA.
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states, the sixth amendment requirement of confrontation and cross-ex-
amination are met.
C. Hearsay Exception Statutes
Twenty-two states have enacted hearsay exception statutes. 34 The
Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. '35 While some of the
child's out-of-court statements are admissible under established excep-
tions to the hearsay rule,36 some commentators have argued for ex-
panding the hearsay exception.37 Such expansion would permit the
admission of the child's out-of-court statements concerning the sexual
abuse. 38 Arguments favoring the enactment of hearsay exceptions in-
clude the recognition of the limitations of traditional exceptions and the
child's need to be protected from the trauma of courtroom testimony. 39
The principal argument against admission of the child's hearsay
statements is the potential compromise of the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to confront witnesses.4° The Supreme Court established gen-
eral standards of admissibility of hearsay statements in Ohio v. Roberts. 41
First, the witness must be unavailable, and second, the statement must
bear adequate "indicia of reliability."' 42 Applying this test in State v. My-
att, 4 3 the Kansas Supreme Court found that the defendant's sixth amend-
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1987);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5
(1985); VT. R. EVID. § 807 (Supp. 1988).
34. ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416(A) (Supp.
1987); ARK. R. EVID 803 (25)(A); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-25-129 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-
10 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE § 232.96(6)
(1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.075 (1985); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 65.00-30 (McKinney 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West Supp.
1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-68 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.072 (Vernon 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1985); VT.
R. EVID. 804a (Supp. 1988) WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
35. FED. R. EvID. 801.
36. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(1) (present sense impression); FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (excited
utterance); FED. R. EvID. 803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition);
FED. R. EvID. 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); FED. R.
EvID. 803(24) & 804(b)(5) (other exceptions); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (prior statement by
witness as non hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony).
37. See Skoler, supra note 7, at 40.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 7.
40. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).
41. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
42. Id. at 66.
43. 237 Kan. 17, 25-28, 697 P.2d 836, 843-45 (1985).
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ment rights were not violated by the admission of hearsay statements
when the child was disqualified as a witness and the evidence fell within a
deeply rooted hearsay exception. Similarly, in State v. Ryan,44 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court found that the hearsay statute allowing statements
of sexual abuse facially conformed to the requirements of Roberts.
Expanded hearsay exceptions statutes, therefore, are constitutional
if they conform to the requirements announced in Roberts: the child vic-
tim must be unavailable to testify and the statement must be reliable.
D. Courtroom Closure Statutes
Twenty-six states have enacted legislation giving the trial court dis-
cretion to close the courtroom. 45 This enables the trial judge to exclude
spectators and the press, thereby lessening the trauma to the child victim.
The purposes of closure are twofold: (1) to reduce reluctance to report
the crime for fear of testifying in public; and (2) to avoid the undue
trauma accompanying courtroom testimony.46
Closing the courtroom, however, implicates both the public's and
press' first amendment right to acquire information,47 and the defend-
ant's right to an open trial.48 The Supreme Court ruled on the constitu-
tionality of one closure statute in Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court. 49
In Globe, members of the press were denied access to a rape trial during
44. 103 Wash. 2d 165, 169-70, 691 P.2d 197, 202 (1984) (en bane).
45. ALA. CODE § 12-21-202 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.048 (1982); ARIZ. R. CRIM.
PROC. 9.3; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-615 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7 (West 1985); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46-b-1l (1978); FLA. STAT. § 918.16 (1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-54 (1985);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38, para. 115-11 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IOWA CODE § 813.2 (1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1552 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 457 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 631.045 (West 1982); Miss. CONST. art. III, § 26; NEv. REv. STAT. § 171.204 (1983);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:8 (1979); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-166 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1974); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-24-6 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901 (1947);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (1978); Wis. STAT. § 970.03(4) (1979). SAMPLE LAWS, supra note
26. Eleven states specifically allow closure during the testimony of a child victim of sexual
assault. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.048 (1984); CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7 (West 1985); FLA.
STAT. § 918.16 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006.1 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 115-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (except to the media); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1552
(Supp. 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, § 16A (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631-045 (West 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:8 (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-24-6 (Supp. 1987).
46. Parker, The Child Witness Versus the Press: A Proposed Legislative Response to Globe
v. Superior Court, 47 ALB. L. REv. 408, 446 (1983).
47. The Supreme Court established the public's and the press' right to attend criminal
trials in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980). See Parker, supra
note 46, at 408 (citing L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE 222 (1978)).
48. The sixth amendment guarantees the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
49. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
the testimony of a minor victim pursuant to a Massachusetts statute
mandating closure in all sex offense trials. While the Court recognized
that the protection of minor victims of sexual crimes from further trauma
was "a compelling governmental interest, ' 50 it found that mandatory
closure of all cases was not justified. Instead, the Court advised a case-
by-case analysis that would take into account the victim's age, psycho-
logical maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires
of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives. 5'
Courtroom closure statutes may be upheld if they give the trial
judge discretion to close the courtroom during the testimony of a child
victim of sexual abuse. The judge must be cognizant of the competing
interests at stake and allow closure only when justified.
E. Closed-Circuit Television Statutes
States also have explored the use of one-way and two-way closed-
circuit television to allow child victims of sexual abuse to testify without
having to see their alleged attacker. Twenty-one states have enacted pro-
visions permitting the use of one-way closed-circuit televisions, one-way
screens, and one-way mirrors. 52 An additional four states permit two-
way closed-circuit televised testimony in which a television monitor
projects the defendant's image into the room where the child is testify-
ing. 53 The enactment of these statutes reflects a desire to protect the
child victim, as well as a "perceived need to strengthen the prosecutor's
hand" in child sexual abuse trials.54
Although the use of this form of protective device implicates the
defendant's sixth amendment rights, several state courts have upheld the
50. Id. at 607.
51. Id. at 608.
52. ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1985); Act
of July 8, 1985, Pub. Act No. 85-587, 1985 Conn. Legis Serv. 463 (West); FLA. STAT. § 92.54
(1985); GA. CODE § 17-8-55 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE
§ 910A.3 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (SuPp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.350
(1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West 1984); MD. CTS & IND. PROC CODE ANN. § 9-
102 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02, subd. 4 (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (1986); Act of Apr. 11,
1985, ch. 126, 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 6; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West 1984); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982, 5985 (Purdon 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (1985); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art 38.071 (Vernon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (1985);
VT. R. EvID. 807 (Supp. 1988). Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Bar Association at
la-6a, State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (1987).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1985); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-30 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1987): OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (C), (E) (Supp. 1987); VT. R. EviD.
807.
54. Note, Televised Testimony vs. The Confrontation Clause... The Use of Videotape in
the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 Hous. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1986) (authored by C.
Michael Clarke) (quoting Note, The Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Abuse Prosecutions:
Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 813 (1985)).
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use of television in these contexts. In State v. Sheppard, 55 a ten year old
sexual assault victim testified in a room near the courtroom that was
equipped with video and audio systems. The court allowed the proce-
dure after considering psychological testimony that children tend to be-
come fearful, guilty, and anxious on the witness stand and that these
feelings produce inaccurate testimony.5 6 A Texas appellate court also
approved the trial court's use of closed-circuit televised testimony in
Hightower v. State, 5 7 reasoning that public policy should not require the
child to relate the details of the offense in front of the defendant and
strangers. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Ludwig, the court allowed the
six year old victim who froze on the stand to testify by closed circuit
television, recognizing that "[t]he Confrontation Clause is not implacable
in its demands.158
The above mentioned statutes illustrate the states' willingness to
provide a reasonable and compassionate compromise to balance the in-
terests of accused and accuser. While recognizing the competing inter-
ests at stake, the statutes offer a range of techniques aimed at lessening
the child victim's trauma. Many of these statutes, however, have been
enacted recently and their effectiveness in ameliorating the problem has
not yet been ascertained.
II. The Supreme Court's Response to State Intervention: Coy
v. Iowa
The Supreme Court recently reviewed State v. Coy, 5 9 which ques-
tioned the constitutionality of one form of statutory protection for child
victims of sexual assault. The statute in question provided for the use of
a screen between the defendant and the victim during the victim's testi-
mony.60 Although the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the procedure, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding that
the use of the screen violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights.61
A. Facts
On the evening of August 2, 1985, two thirteen year old girls spent
the night in a make-shift tent in one girl's backyard. They were awak-
ened early in the morning by the presence of the assailant in their tent.
According to the girls' testimony, the assailant fondled their genitalia
55. 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
56. Id. at 416, 484 A.2d at 1332.
57. 736 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
58. 366 Pa. Super. 361, 367, 531 A.2d 459, 462 (1987).
59. 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
60. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988).
61. Id. at 2802.
and forced them to perform oral sexual acts. 62 He also unsuccessfully
demanded that they urinate on him. 63 Upon the assailant's departure, he
warned the girls that they should not tell or "they would have to go
through a lot." 64 The girls never saw the assailant's face, as he wore a
mask and shined a flashlight in their eyes when they looked at him.65
Later that day, based on a tip from the father of one of the girls, a
search warrant for John Coy's house was obtained. 66 This search pro-
duced items implicating Coy in the assault.67 Subsequently, Coy was ar-
rested and charged with two counts of lascivious acts with a child.
B. Courtroom Procedure
Pursuant to Iowa law,68 the prosecution requested that the testi-
mony of the two child witnesses be taken by closed-circuit television or
that the defendant be confined behind a screen or mirror. 69 The trial
court considered both options, and decided that the screen would be "a
more moderate and [the] least obtrusive approach. ' 70 Defendant's coun-
sel objected, stating that the device was unnecessary since the victims
could not identify their assailant. 71 The court decided, however, that the
statute was intended to protect child victims even if they could not iden-
tify their attacker.72
Over defense counsel's objections, the screen was positioned in the
courtroom. Although the witness was in full view of the defendant,
judge, jury, and counsel, she could not see the defendant because the
62. Id. at 2799.
63. Transcript of Proceedings in Appendix of Appeal at 64, State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d
730 (Iowa 1986) (No. 85-1842), rev'd, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) [hereinafter
Transcript].
64. Id. at 66.
65. Id. at 66, 96, 99-100.
66. The father and one of his neighbors entered Coy's home and discovered a yellow
plastic drinking cup that was the same type of cup the girls had in the tent. They immediately
informed the police. The Supreme Court of Iowa found no violation of the defendant's fourth
amendment rights because the father and neighbor were not acting as agents of the police. See
Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 732-33.
67. The items seized included a flashlight, a yellow plastic drinking cup, and a clothing-
bag shaped item, all of which the assailant had taken from the tent. Id. at 732.
68. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (Supp. 1985) provides:
Upon its own motion or upon motion for either party, in a proceeding when the child
is under the age of 14, the court may order use of the one-way closed-circuit televi-
sion, or the confinement of the witness behind a screen or mirror, at the same time
insuring that the party and counsel can confer, and informing the child that he or she
can be seen or heard.
69. Transcript, supra note 63, at 35.
70. Id. at 40.
71. Id. at 49.
72. Id. at 50-54.
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courtroom was darkened and the screen illuminated.73
Recognizing that the procedure created a dramatic effect, the judge
gave a special jury instruction to ensure that the defendant received a fair
trial. At the start of the trial, he told the jury that the screen was being
used pursuant to a recently enacted law, and that no inference should be
drawn from the presence of the screen. 74 Specifically, the judge warned
that "[the screen was] not evidence of the defendant's guilt and it
shouldn't be in your mind as an inference as to any guilt on his part. It's
very important that you do that intellectual thing."175 A unanimous jury
found the defendant guilty of two counts of lascivious acts with a child.76
Coy appealed, contending that the courtroom procedures had violated
his constitutional rights.77
C. The Iowa Supreme Court Decision
Coy based his appeal on three claims. First, he asserted that his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. 78
Second, he claimed that the use of the screen created a strong and preju-
dicial inference of guilt, violating his right to a fair trial.79 Finally,
although Coy did not allege that the trial court failed to comply with the
specific terms of the statutory provision, he argued that a finding of ne-
cessity was proper before the statute was implemented. 80
After reviewing Coy's claim of errors, the Iowa Supreme Court up-
held his conviction. The court found that Coy's constitutional rights
were fully protected by the express requirements of the statute, and that
the trial court had no obligation to make an independent finding of
necessity. 81
D. The United States Supreme Court Opinions
(1) The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reversed the decision of the
Iowa Supreme Court, finding that the barrier violated Coy's right to con-
front his accusers. 82 His opinion set forth a history of the sixth amend-
ment, complete with quotations from the Roman Governor Festus,
73. Id. at 55.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 730 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798
(1988).
77. Id. at 730-31.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 733.
81. Id.
82. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988).
Shakespeare, and President Eisenhower.8 3 The Court noted that the lan-
guage of the sixth amendment "comes to us on faded parchment"84 and
found that the confrontation clause confers at least "a right to meet face
to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial."85
In support of its historical discussion of the right to face to face
confrontation, the Court stated that "[t]his opinion is embellished with
references to and quotations from antiquity in part to convey that there is
something deep in human nature that regards face to face confrontation
between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution.' "86 Although the face to face presence may upset the truth-
ful rape victim or abused child, "it may confound and undo the false
accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism
that constitutional protections have costs." '8 7
The Court ruled that the procedure used by the Iowa court was an
obvious and damaging violation of Coy's right to a face to face encoun-
ter.88 While it recognized that rights conferred by the confrontation
clause may at times give way to other important interests, the only rights
that may be overcome in the balance are those that are reasonably im-
plicit, rather than explicitly stated, in the clause: the right to cross-ex-
amine, the right to exclude out-of-court statements, and the asserted
right to face to face confrontation at some point in the proceedings other
than the trial itself.89
The Court did not directly consider whether the confrontation be-
tween a child sexual assault victim and the accused could constitute an
exception to the face to face encounter requirement of the confrontation
clause. Rather, it said, "We leave for another day . . . the question
whether any exceptions exist." 90 The Court hinted at its position,
though, by noting that even if exceptions do exist, they would have to be
"firmly . . . rooted in our jurisprudence." 91 Apparently, the Court did
not feel that an exception created by a statute enacted in 1985 was firmly
rooted in jurisprudence. 92 Therefore, the procedure violated Coy's right
of confrontation.
83. Id. at 2800-01.
84. Id. at 2800 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2801 (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 2802.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2802-03.
90. Id. at 2803.
91. Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987)).
92. Because the Court found a sixth amendment violation, it did not reach Coy's due
process claim. Id.
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(2) The Concurrence
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice
White joined. Although Justice O'Connor agreed that Coy's confronta-
tion rights were violated in this instance,93 she noted that confrontation
clause rights "may give way in an appropriate case to other competing
interests so as to permit the use of certain procedural devices designed to
shield a child witness from the trauma of courtroom testimony."'94 Jus-
tice O'Connor recognized the increasing problem of child abuse in to-
day's society, and that half of the states have authorized the use of one-
or two-way closed-circuit televisions.95 She wrote especially to clarify
that the majority decision did not "doom[] such efforts by state legisla-
tures to protect child witnesses."' 96
(3) The Dissent
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined. The opinion expressed strong disagreement with
the majority's analysis of the confrontation clause as applied in the case.
Two reasons were given for this disagreement. First, the majority did
not mention the minimal infringement upon the appellant's confronta-
tion clause interests in considering whether competing public policies jus-
tified the procedures employed 97. Second, the majority opinion may
induce states that are attempting to adopt innovative protective tech-
niques to sacrifice other, more central, confrontation interests for the
sake of preserving face to face confrontation. 98 The dissent further criti-
cized the Court's reliance on literature, anecdote, and dicta rather than
precedent.99
Similar to the concurrence, the dissent noted the important state
interests underlying the Iowa statute.
[T]he fear and trauma associated with a child's testimony' in front of
the defendant has two serious identifiable consequences: It may cause
psychological injury to the child, and it may so overwhelm the child as
to prevent the possibility of effective testimony, thereby undermining
the truthfinding function of the trial itself.l°°
In Justice Blackmun's view, this public policy outweighed the nar-
93. The requirements of the confrontation clause may give way if a court makes a case-
specific finding of necessity. Because the Iowa Supreme Court made no such finding, Coy's
rights were violated. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 2803.
95. Id at 2804.
96. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 2806.
98. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2809 (footnote omitted).
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row infringement on the defendant's confrontation clause right.101 Jus-
tice Blackmun concluded that the procedure authorized by the Iowa
statute was constitutionally permissible. 10 2 The following section sup-
ports and expands upon the conclusion reached by the dissent.
III. Criticism and Implications
"Constitutional review by an independent judiciary is a tool of
proven use in the American quest for an open society of widely dispersed
powers."' 103 This power of review, however, must be exercised with care
and caution. As both the concurring and dissenting opinions point out,
the Coy majority neither adhered to precedent nor gave proper weight to
the societal interests in protecting the child victims in arriving at its deci-
sion. 104 The Court's opinion was inconsistent with prior cases involving
the confrontation clause, 10 5 and it did not fully consider the pressing
public policy behind the implementation of the Iowa statute. 106
A. Prior Confrontation Clause Cases
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution states: "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against him." 10 7
Prior to Coy, the Supreme Court was less stringent in its demand for face
to face confrontation in interpreting the confrontation clause. A review
of these Supreme Court cases illustrates the Coy break with precedent.
The landmark Supreme Court opinion on this issue is Mattox v.
United States.'108 Mattox involved a murder trial in which two of the
state's witnesses died before trial. The trial court admitted a reporter's
notes of the witnesses' testimony at a former trial.'0 9 The defendant
challenged the evidence as abridging his sixth amendment rights. The
Court held the testimony admissible as a hearsay exception. 10 Justice
Brown wrote: "There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused
should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards ... [b]ut general
rules of law of this kind ... must occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and the necessities of the case."'
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 199
(1952).
104. 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. See infra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
108. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
109. Id. at 238.
110. Id. at 244.
111. Id. at 243.
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Seventy-five years later, in California v. Green, 112 the Supreme Court
held that prior inconsistent statements made by a witness at the respon-
dent's preliminary hearing were admissible at trial. In writing for the
majority, Justice White explained that the right of confrontation evolved
from the practice of trying defendants on evidence that consisted solely
of affidavits and depositions-by the examining magistrate.11 3 This prac-
tice denied the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a
face to face encounter before the jury. The purpose of the confrontation
clause, therefore, was to insure that the witness gives his statement under
oath, to force the witness to submit to cross-examination, and to permit
the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement. 114
More recent cases have prompted a clarification and reiteration of
the underlying premise of the sixth amendment. In Ohio v. Roberts, 115 an
unavailable witness' preliminary hearing testimony was held admissible
after an initial finding of necessity and indicia of reliability. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, emphasized that the confrontation
clause reflected apreference for direct confrontation, but the primary in-
terest protected was cross-examination. 16 Similarly, the Court in Dela-
ware v. Fensterer117 upheld a murder conviction in which an expert's
opinion testimony was admitted despite his inability to recall the basis
for his opinion. The Court found that the confrontation clause guaran-
tees only an opportunity for cross-examination, not the effectiveness of
the cross-examination.118 Moreover, the Court's language in Green was
repeated: "[A]ssurances of reliability our cases have found in the right
of cross-examination are fully satisfied in cases such as this [in which] the
factfnder can observe the witness' demeanor under cross-examination,
and the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of the
accused." 119
Two additional Supreme Court cases are worthy of mention because
of their factual similarity to Coy. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 120 the de-
fendant was charged with rape, involuntary sexual intercourse, incest,
and corruption of a minor. The Court considered whether the state's
interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child
abuse must yield to the defendant's sixth amendment right to discover
112. 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 158.
115. 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980).
116. Id. at 63.
117. 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (per curiam).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
favorable evidence. 121 The defendant claimed that "by denying him ac-
cess to information necessary to prepare his defense, the trial court inter-
fered with his right of cross-examination."' 122 The Court reaffirmed the
Fensterer opinion, holding that failure to disclose the file did not violate
the confrontation clause. 123 A confrontation clause infringement claim
will only be upheld when there is "a specific statutory or court-imposed
restriction at trial on the scope of questioning."' 124
Similarly, the Court found no constitutional violation in Kentucky v.
Stincer. 125 The defendant was convicted of committing sodomy with two
minor girls. 126 He was excluded from the hearing in which the victims
competency to testify was determined. The defendant's counsel, how-
ever, was present. According to the Court, because this was a pretrial
hearing in which the validity of the accusations were not at issue, the
exclusion did not violate the defendant's rights. 127 The Court ruled that
the right to cross-examination is essentially "a 'functional' right to pro-
mote reliability in the truth-finding function of a criminal trial."'128
In summary, the Supreme Court's analysis of confrontation clause
cases emphasizes the right of cross-examination, which Dean Wigmore
called "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth."'' 2 9 In each case, the ultimate issue was whether the defendant
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness either before or during
the trial. The requirements that the testimony be taken under oath and
that the defendant and jury be able to observe the witness' demeanor
while testifying are of less importance. 130
The constitutionality of the barrier device used in Coy should have
been upheld as the principles inherent in the right of confrontation were
preserved. First, the child witnesses testified under oath. In no way was
this requirement abridged. Second, both the defendant and the jury were
able to observe the witnesses' demeanor while they testified. Finally, the
defendant was given an unrestricted opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses. The screening device used fully satisfied the interests of wit-
nesses, defendants, and the jury. Thus, no violation of the sixth amend-
ment resulted.
121. Id. at 994.
122. Id. at 998.
123. Id. at 999.
124. Id. at 1000.
125. 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987).
126. Id. at 2659.
127. Id. at 2666.
128. Id. at 2662.
129. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1946)).
130. See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
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B. Societal Interests
In focusing on a mundane and previously unrecognized interpreta-
tion of "confrontation," the majority opinion also deemphasized the soci-
etal interests involved. Justice Scalia dismissed the public policy issue
stating, "It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs. 1 31 The
majority failed to take into account, however, that without the child vic-
tim's testimony, successful prosecutions of sexual crimes are rare.132
This hampers the effective administration of justice.133 Protecting the
child victim, on the other hand, advances two interests: (1) it helps the
court in ascertaining the truth; and (2) it protects the child from undue
trauma.
The first interest in ascertaining the truth requires consideration of
the child's emotional state. Ignoring the child's guilt, fear, trauma, and
cognitive immaturity hampers the child's ability to testify effectively.134
The trauma of testifying may reduce the reliability of the victim's testi-
mony,135 deter the witness from testifying in an uninhibited manner,1 36
and cause the victim to "freeze" on the witness stand, which diminishes
credibility and reduces the amount of information gathered.1 37 Thus, ad-
dressing the child's needs enhances the quality and quantity of testimony.
The second interest is in avoiding the child's exposure to undue
trauma. A child may not understand the reason for confrontation and
"the anticipation of being in close proximity to the defendant can be
overwhelming." 138 As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, "studies of
children who have testified in court indicate that such testimony is 'asso-
ciated with increased behavioral disturbance in children.' "139 Allowing
the use of ameliorative techniques may reduce the psychological impact
of testifying.
To conclude, weighing these interests against the "narrow Confron-
tation Clause right at issue here-the 'preference' for having the defend-
131. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
132. See Skoler, supra note 7, at 5-6.
133. See Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Sex Crime Trials, 22 B.C.L. REv.
361, 364 (1981) (authored by Donald L. Keller, Jr.).
134. Skoler, supra note 7, at 38.
135. See Note, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings: Their Capabilities,
Special Problems, and Proposals for Reform, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 157, 164-65 (1985) (au-
thored by Dominic J. Fot6).
136. See Note, supra note 133, at 364.
137. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Bar Association at 10, State v. Coy, 397
N.W.2d 730 (1987) (No. 86-6757), rev'd, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
138. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting D. WHIT-
COMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGAN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES
AND PROSECUTORS 17-18 (1985)).
139. Id; see also Goodman, The Emotional Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on Child
Sexual Abuse Victims, Proceedings from the International Conference on Child Witnesses: Do
the Courts Abuse Children? (BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, in press).
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ant within the witness' sight while the witness testifies,"' 40 the societal
interests must prevail. As Justice Cardozo proclaimed: "Justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true."' 141
C. Implications
Most of the statutory schemes reviewed were enacted recently.
Courts have not yet established the acceptable boundaries of the legisla-
tion. The Coy Court's invalidation of the barrier device may portend the
invalidation of similar statutes. Indeed, the Globe decision illustrates the
profound effect the Supreme Court's disapproval can have on lower
courts. After the Globe case invalidated mandatory closure statutes, only
three reported appellate court decisions upheld closure of the courtroom
during the testimony of a child sexual assault victim. 142 The Globe deci-
sion could have been an opening for trial judges to assess each individual
case and protect the minor victim when necessary. Instead, the decision
served to reduce actual closures.
The majority opinion may cultivate Justice Blackmun's fears "that
the Court's apparent fascination with the witness' ability to see the de-
fendant will lead the States that are attempting to adopt innovations...
to sacrifice other, more central, confrontation interests." 143 Because
neither hearsay exceptions, admission of videotaped testimony, nor
closed-circuit television allow for face to face confrontation, these protec-
tive systems could be invalidated, leaving nothing in their place. Conse-
quently, the child would be required to either testify with no protective
device at all, or sacrifice testimony completely. Neither alternative
would strengthen the truth finding function of the court. 44
On the other hand, Coy's impact on future adjudications could be
minimal. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the Iowa provision au-
thorizing the use of the screen is the only statute of its kind. Second, four
Justices-O'Connor, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist-demonstrated
their belief that other protective procedures might be found constitu-
tional.145 One state court already has relied on this language to uphold
legislation allowing a child abuse victim to testify via closed-circuit tele-
140. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
142. People v. Morgan, 152 Ill. App. 3d 97, 103, 504 N.E.2d 172, 177 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 189 (1987); State v. Workman, 14 Ohio App. 3d 385, 389, 471 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984); Mosby v. State, 703 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
143. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. The majority in Coy insisted upon face to face confrontation because of their belief
that this ensures the integrity of the fact finding process. 108 S. Ct. at 2802. If the child
witness does not testify, however, the integrity of such process is severely undermined.
145. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
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vision. "[We construe the majority opinion in Coy as did the concurring
justices, as simply striking down one procedure used in that case and
reserving for future consideration whether the more common approaches
authorized by most states will suffice." 146 Therefore, statutes that pro-
vide two-way viewing and have a necessity prong may pass constitutional
muster. 147 Conversely, statutes with few requirements will probably not
be upheld because of the preeminence of the accused's constitutional
rights.
Conclusion
The confrontation clause affords criminal defendants an opportunity
to confront their accusers in all criminal prosecutions. Although this
right may be essential to a fair trial, at times it must be balanced with
other interests. One such interest is the protection of child victims of
sexual abuse from the trauma of testifying face to face with the accused.
States have enacted legislation aimed at protecting the child witness, but
the suggested techniques may infringe the accused's constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court recently considered the constitutionality of one
procedure designed to protect child victims. In Coy v. Iowa, the trial
court permitted a one-way screening barrier to be placed between the
accused and the complaining child witnesses at trial. The Court found
that the procedure violated Coy's sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion and reversed the conviction.
The Court's opinion is subject to criticism on two grounds. First,
the decision was inconsistent with prior confrontation clause cases. The
children testified under oath, the defendant and jury were able to witness
their demeanor, and the defendant was given an unrestricted opportunity
'to cross-examine the witnesses. Thus, the barrier technique satisfied the
sixth amendment requirements set forth in prior Supreme Court deci-
sions. Second, the majority underplayed the societal interests involved.
Protecting the child victim enhances the truth finding function of the
courts, and avoids the child's exposure to undue trauma.
Although Supreme Court decisions often have great impact on
emerging areas of law, the Coy decision will most likely bar only those
statutes that do not provide for two-way viewing and a necessity prong.
As Justice O'Connor specified in her concurrence, "our cases suggest
that the strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the com-
146. Craig v. Maryland, 57 U.S.L.W. 2120, 2121 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Aug. 3, 1988) (No.
1547-1987).
147. "[I]f a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity, as is required by a number of
state statutes .... our cases suggest that the strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give
way to the compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses." Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
pelling state interest of protecting child witnesses."1 48 Therefore, legisla-
tion that is carefully crafted to accommodate the defendant's preeminent
constitutional rights should be acceptable.
148. Id.
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